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The use of moral appeals to affect the behavior of others is pervasive (from the pulpit to ethics classes)
but little is known about the effects of moral suasion on behavior. In a series of experiments we study
whether moral suasion affects behavior in voluntary contribution games and mechanisms by which
behavior is altered. We find that observing a message with a moral standard according to the golden
rule or, alternatively, utilitarian philosophy, results in a significant but transitory increase in contributions
above the levels observed for subjects that did not receive a message or received a message that advised
them to contribute without a moral rationale. When players have the option of punishing each other
after the contribution stage the effect of the moral messages on contributions becomes persistent: punishments
and moral messages interact to sustain cooperation. We investigate the mechanism through which
moral suasion operates and find it to involve both expectation- and preference-shifting effects. These
results suggest that the use of moral appeals can be an effective way of promoting cooperation.
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The typical assumption in the study of incentives in economics is that people have to be
compensated in order to carry out a costly task. However, everyday life abounds in examples
where individuals are encouraged not through payments but through appeals of a normative
kind. Instances of moral suasion are ubiquitous ￿ they take place in religious ceremonies
(avoid sin), political arguments (this policy is right), they are part of educational indoctri-
nation (it is wrong to cheat), marketing strategy (buy fair trade), and the workplace (be a
teamplayer). This suggests that there might be room for motivation through moral appeals
beyond what money or other forms of compensation can buy.
A large share of empirical and experimental research in economics has been devoted
to measuring how extrinsic incentives can be manipulated to a⁄ect behavior. We have no
equivalent knowledge on the e⁄ectiveness of moral suasion. In this paper we report on a
series of experiments designed to ascertain the e⁄ects of moral suasion on cooperation. We
focus on a public good game, or voluntary contribution game, as it o⁄ers a clear setting
where private and social objectives collide. In such a setting we expose subjects to di⁄erent
messages, some of which contain a moral argument. We then evaluate the e⁄ects of messages
on subsequent contribution levels.
All four of our experiments involved a voluntary contribution game played through com-
puters. In our ￿rst experiment, each session consisted of twenty rounds of a two-person
public good game where subjects were randomly rematched after each round. Subjects were
given an endowment in each round that they could invest on either a personal account or
a joint, ￿productive￿account. Investments in the personal account were retained by the
subject. Investments in the joint account were multiplied by 1.4, but divided evenly between
the two players of the round, thus yielding an individual net return of only 0.7 per unit
invested. The symmetric e¢ cient outcome and Utilitarian optimum is to contribute the
entire endowment to the joint account while the unique Nash equilibrium is to contribute
zero. Between rounds 10 and 11 subjects saw a randomly chosen message out of a set of
possible messages. In the ￿rst experiment there were ￿ve di⁄erent messages, including a
blank message and two messages with distinct moral content. One stated that moral actions
are those that treat others as you would like to be treated. This principle, usually called the
￿golden rule,￿has been present in most culture and religions throughout history (Wattles
21996). The other moral message had a consequentialist, utilitarian root (see Mill 1863). It
stated that actions are moral to the extent that they contribute to maximizing collective
payo⁄s. Subjects that could be matched to each other saw the same message.
The ￿rst experiment revealed that the moral messages had a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect
on contributions. Contributions in the pre-message phase were statistically indistinguishable
across the ￿ve message categories. But the average contributions in the post-message phase
of the experiment where higher for the two moral treatments than in the pre-message phase,
something that was not true for the other three messages. One of these was a blank message,
another was a simple suggestion to contribute that did not involve an explicitly moral back-
ing, and which was included to control for potential demand e⁄ects, and the last message
stated that in game theory rational and sel￿sh individuals are assumed to maximize their
own payo⁄s.
The e⁄ect of the moral appeals was transitory. While contributions in the ￿rst few
post-message rounds were higher for the moral treatment groups, they were not signi￿cantly
higher for the last few rounds.
Our second experiment added a punishment stage after the contribution stage in each
round, as in Ostrom et al (1992) and Fehr and G￿chter (2000). This allowed players to
punish low contributors without having to lower their own contributions. We then exposed
subjects to one of two messages, either the blank message or the golden rule message. The
pre-message rounds displayed higher cooperation levels than in the ￿rst experiment, although
they continued to display a decreasing trend. The golden rule message triggered a signi￿cant
increase in contributions. Moreover, in the presence of punishment, the e⁄ect of the moral
message was persistent. While moral messages alone (in experiment one) and punishments
alone (in the pre-message phase in experiment two) did not appear to guarantee high and
persistent cooperation, the interactive e⁄ect of punishments and a moral appeal did sustain
cooperation at fairly high levels.
To summarize, moral suasion has an e⁄ect that goes beyond a basic demand e⁄ect, and
that is persistent in games where players can separately decide on contributions and pun-
ishments. A natural question is on the channels through which moral messages may a⁄ect
behavior. We characterize di⁄erent mechanisms by relying on a simple model where prefer-
ences include a taste for reciprocity as well as an inclination to satisfy a moral imperative.1
1On preferences that di⁄er from material payo⁄s see Andreoni (1990), Levine (1998) and Charness and
3A ￿rst possibility is that moral messages a⁄ect, perhaps temporarily, subjects￿preferences,
by raising the level of contribution they deem morally right, or by raising the utility weight
on meeting that level. We call this a pure preference e⁄ect. But another possibility is that
messages change players￿expectations about the behavior of others. To be sure, a voluntary
contribution game has a dominant strategy so expectations about the behavior of others is
not an issue in principle. But if individuals have a preference for reciprocity, they may want
to contribute more if they expect others to do so. In that context, a moral message may
simply signal that others will behave better. This may obey to two di⁄erent reasons. One
is that the preferences of others have been a⁄ected. The other way in which a subject￿ s
beliefs matter is when other players could switch to play a di⁄erent equilibrium (a purely
belief-based, or coordination, e⁄ect). In this paper we present results from two experiments
showing that expectations play a role (either in connection with possible changes in the
preferences of others or due to pure coordination), and that pure preference e⁄ects are also
present.
To determine whether expectations matter at all we conducted a modi￿ed version of
our ￿rst experiment where we manipulated subjects￿expectations of the probability that
other players had seen the same message. We found that the e⁄ects of a moral message
became weaker when the probability that others had also seen the golden rule message was
capped at 50%. This indicates that expectation e⁄ects are one way in which moral appeals
work. In order to determine whether pure-preference e⁄ects are also present, we conducted
a ￿nal experiment were a subset of players knew that those they were matched with had
seen a blank message. We found that among that subset, those receiving a moral message
cooperated more than those seeing a blank message. The fact that moral messages have an
e⁄ect even when holding ￿xed the message seen by a subject￿ s partner indicates that moral
suasion operates partly by shifting the subject￿ s preference over contributions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section describes related literature.
Section 3 describes our ￿rst experiment and reports its results. Section 4 describes our second
experiment and reports its results. Section 5 proposes a framework to distinguish among
the types of e⁄ects that can be triggered by the messages, and explains how our third and
fourth experiments can disentangle them. We then report results from these experiments.
Section 6 concludes.
Rabin (2002) among others.
42 Related literature
To our knowledge this paper is the ￿rst to report a lab study of the e⁄ect of moral discourse
on contributions in public good games. Interestingly, in his well known survey Ledyard
(1995) mentions that ￿moral suasion￿is one of the forces that may a⁄ect behavior in such
games but remained unexplored.
Our paper is not however the ￿rst to include moral suasion in experiments. Bohm (1972)
compares revealed willingness to pay in a public good ￿eld experiment across mechanisms,
some of which included moral statements. However, his experiment does not allow for a
study of the e⁄ect of moral statements because the type of mechanism varied together with
the presence of those statements.
An earlier antecedent is the work by Schwarz and Orleans (1967). They conducted a
￿eld experiment where they interviewed individuals a month before they would ￿le their
tax returns. The interviews involved a questionnaire with a subset of questions varying by
treatment group. A ￿sanction￿group received some questions asking whether the respon-
dent agreed with di⁄erent attitudes towards compliance and enforcement approaches. The
￿conscience￿group answered questions mentioning obligation to respect the law, to put the
social interest ahead of self-interest, and connections between tax evasion and draft dodging.
These authors found signi￿cant e⁄ects of the ￿conscience￿treatment on tax compliance.
McGraw and Scholz (1991) studied tax compliance after exposing individuals to two
di⁄erent video tapes. One of these mentioned the existence of aggressive legal strategies to
minimizing tax exposure while the other mentioned ￿the importance that Americans place
on norms of social responsibility and patriotism, emphasizing how these norms are related to
tax compliance.￿These authors found no signi￿cant e⁄ects. A posterior tax compliance ￿eld
study by Blumenthal, Christian, and Slemrod (2001) in Minnesota also found no signi￿cant
e⁄ects on tax returns of normative messages mentioning fairness. A recent study by Fellner,
Sausgruber and Traxler (2009) targeted potential evaders of TV license fees in Austria. They
study the e⁄ects of sending messages to non-payors reminding them of the need to pay fees,
and vary treatments according to various conditions. One of these contained an appeal
stating that not paying harmed other households, so paying was a matter of fairness. No
signi￿cant e⁄ects of the normative appeal were found on registration rates. As the authors
state, this might be because normative appeals are unlikely to work with people who are
5quite inclined to evasion.
Overall, the evidence from ￿eld experiments on enforcement tends to indicate that nor-
mative appeals are ine⁄ective. Besides sampling issues on selection and size, in a ￿eld
experiments substantial time may elapse between treatment and action. Subjects may also
suspect a sel￿sh manipulation from an authority that is seeking to collect a tax or a fee,
and disregard normative appeals. Moreover, the norms of fairness and responsibility that
have been invoked in previous experimental work lacked a clear ethical underpinning. These
issues raise the question of whether moral suasion is always ine⁄ective.
Our paper also relates to the literature studying the e⁄ects of recommendations, without
appealing to moral rules, on contributions in public good games. This literature has found
limited or no e⁄ects of recommendations on contributions (see Marks et al. 1999 and Cro-
son and Marks 2001 for evidence from threshold public good games and Dale and Morgan
2004 for linear public good games).2 Interestingly, Dale and Morgan 2004 found that recom-
mendations favoring the top contribution worked less well than recommendations favoring
intermediate contributions. The former tended, if anything, to reduce contributions. This
provides an interesting contrast with our ￿ndings, where e⁄ects are positive even when the
moral messages recommend the maximum possible contribution level.
Previous literature has shown that communication between subjects can increase contri-
butions in public good games (see Isaac et al. 1985, Isaac and Walker 1988, and Bochet et al.
2006). This paper shows that communication with moral content from the experimenter can
a⁄ect contributions. It remains to be studied whether communication with moral content
from a subject also has an e⁄ect.
The results of this paper can be interpreted as capturing the e⁄ect of moral framing; see
Andreoni (1995) for the e⁄ect of framing on public good games. Recent work by Braæas
Garza (2006) shows an increase in giving in dictator games where dictators are reminded
that ￿the other players is in your hands,￿ indicating that a framing that raises personal
responsibility for the payo⁄ of others can be e⁄ective.
2On the e⁄ect of recommendations on coordination games see Van Huyck et al. (1992) and Brandts and
MacLeod (1995).
63 Experiment 1: Does moral suasion a⁄ect coopera-
tion?
This section covers an experiment that focuses on whether exposure to moral appeals matters
for cooperative behavior.
3.1 Experimental design
We conducted 21 experimental sessions at XLAB, UC Berkeley with a total of 320 subjects.
The subjects were UC Berkeley students. Subjects interacted exclusively through individual
computer terminals. These terminals were separated by lateral partitions that prevented
subjects from observing the screens of other subjects￿computers. Subjects were paid pri-
vately at the end of the session by XLAB personnel. The experimenter￿ s server allocated
subjects randomly to groups of eight people. Each player was randomly matched by the
server to another person in the group each round. In each round subjects received an en-
dowment of 10 experimental points (or EPs - the exchange rate was 12 EPs for one dollar),
and had to decide how much of those to allocate to a personal account and a joint account.
Subjects could choose to contribute any number between 0 and 10 up to two decimal points.
EPs allocated to the personal account went directly into the person￿ s earnings. EPs going to
the joint account got multiplied by an e¢ ciency factor of 1.4, and then divided between the
two participants in the interaction. Therefore, the individual return for placing one EP in
the joint account was only 0.7 of an EP. It follows that although the Utilitarian optimum and
e¢ cient symmetric outcome would be for both players to contribute their whole endowments
(leading to payo⁄s of 14 for each) the Nash equilibrium is for both to contribute zero to the
joint account (yielding 10 for each). After each round, players got randomly rematched to
another member of their group.
After ten rounds, subjects saw a message in their computers, randomly selected randomly
by the server from a set of ￿ve possible messages. All subjects in the same group saw the
same message. These messages are detailed in Table 1. One was a blank message (hence-
forth ￿Blank￿ ), another one contained a suggestion to contribute without moral content
(henceforth ￿Suggestion￿ ), another one expressed the fact that in game theory rational and
sel￿sh individuals maximize their own payo⁄s (henceforth ￿Nash￿ ), and the other two were
7the moral messages. One of these messages expressed that an action is moral if it treats
others as you would like to be treated by others (henceforth ￿Golden Rule￿ ). The other
one expressed the Act-Utilitarian standard according to which individual actions are moral
if they maximize the sum of all players￿payo⁄s (henceforth ￿Utilitarian￿ ).
Two aspects of the moral messages are worth discussing. One is the reason to include
two di⁄erent moral messages. The other one is the precise wording of these messages. The
reason to include two di⁄erent moral messages is that they express very di⁄erent principles.
While the Utilitarian message is consequentialist (the moral tenor of actions depends on
their consequences) the Golden Rule principle abstracts from consequences and appeals to a
reversibility property (act in a way towards others that you would have others act towards
you). As such, this standard is more duty-based, and therefore can be related more closely
to the main opponent of consequentialist ethics, namely the deontological Kantian view
expressed in the categorical imperative.3 A natural question is whether moral messages
matter at all, and if so, whether consequentialist arguments are more or less powerful than
duty-based ones.
The precise wording of messages sought to make as clear as possible the messages and
their implications. Thus, if no e⁄ects were found, one could not argue this had been due
to players not fully understanding the normative implications of the messages. Both moral
messages as well as the morality-free suggestion to contribute included an added sentence
stating ￿If you were to act according to this rule, you should contribute 10 EPs.￿
Players were informed about all details of the game, and about the fact that a message
randomly selected by the computer from a set of messages would be shown to them after
round 10. At the end of the experiment subjects answered a questionnaire. They were asked
to identify the message they had seen, and to provide information about their ￿eld of study,
gender, SAT scores, and ideology (ranking from 0, most liberal, to 10, most conservative).
3.2 Results
Subjects earned an average of $23.18, with a minimum of $18.35 and a maximum of $29.81.
Given that sessions lasted on average less than an hour, the earnings represent a reasonable
3The catogorical imperative is to act according to a maxim that one could will to be a universal rule. The
golden rule is not equivalent to the Kantian Categorical Imperative (in fact Kant is said to have despised
golden-rule - like principles), although it can be derived from it under appropriate restrictions.
8hourly rate. A high number of subjects (87%) correctly remembered at the end of the
experiment the message that had been shown to their group.
Panel A of Table 2 shows the evolution of contributions to the joint account by round
and message in columns (1) and (2). In the ￿rst part of the experiment (rounds 1 to 10)
the evolution of contributions follows the usual pattern: contributions are substantial at the
beginning but decrease as the players gain experience.4 It is important to note that there
are no signi￿cant di⁄erences in behavior across groups that ended seeing di⁄erent messages,
consistent with the random assignment of messages.
Did messages a⁄ect behavior? From Table 2 we can see that for all messages but the
moral messages, contributions were smaller in the second part of the experiment than in
the ￿rst part. Figure 1 shows average contributions by treatment category for each of the
twenty rounds. Figure 2 shows the increase in contributions after the messages were shown.
We perform two comparisons. In the ￿rst panel of Figure 2 we plot the change the whole
pre-message ten rounds to the post-message ten rounds. The second panel of Figure 2 shows
the change of the average contribution (by treatment category) from round 10 to round 11.
We aggregate individual contributions at the level of the group and perform Wilcoxon
rank-sum tests to statistically compare the contribution increases that occur in the post-
message phase. These are reported in Table 2, panel B. We ￿nd that the increase in con-
tributions under the moral messages is greater than the increase under the blank message
(p-values of 0:093 and 0:016 for Golden Rule and Utilitarian respectively). On the other
hand there are no signi￿cant di⁄erences in the increase of contributions for Nash or Sug-
gestion relative to Blank (p-values of 0:29 and 0:83 for Nash and Suggestion respectively).
More importantly, the increase in contributions under the moral messages is greater than
under Suggestion (p-values of 0:036 and 0:009 for Golden Rule and Utilitarian respectively).
This shows that it is not just the recommendation of a given contribution level that a⁄ects
behavior, but that the explicitly moral part of the statement has an e⁄ect. True, the Sug-
gestion message also generates an increase in contributions in round 11, but such increase
is smaller than that induced by the moral messages and the increase erodes faster in the
immediately following rounds. This indicates that the overall e⁄ect of the moral messages
cannot be attributed exclusively to an experimenters￿demand e⁄ect. The moral messages
trigger an additional e⁄ect that causes the contributions to jump higher immediately after
4For a summary of the literature on public good games see Ledyard (1995).
9the message and erode more slowly in the following rounds.
Similar results are obtained if we focus on the change from round 10 to 11 but some of
the signi￿cance levels are changed. Both the Utilitarian and Golden Rule messages generate
signi￿cant increases in contributions from round 10 to 11 relative to Blank (p-values of
0:031 and 0:001, respectively ￿ see Table 2, Panel B). While the Utilitarian message seems
to have a greater impact than the Golden Rule when we compare part 2 versus 1 (i.e. post-
versus pre-message phases) and the opposite happens wen we compare round 11 versus 10,
these di⁄erences are not signi￿cant (p-values of 0:401 and 0:4 respectively). The Suggestion
message generates a signi￿cant increase in contributions from round 10 to 11 ￿ p-value of
0:018, see Table 2, Panel B).5 The Golden Rule message generates an increase in contributions
from round 10 to 11 that is statistically higher than that of the Suggestion message (p-
value of 0:04). In other words, although the suggestion message that is intended to capture
demand e⁄ects does have an impact on contributions in round 11, two facts are noteworthy.
The increase in contributions from round 10 to 11 is higher for the moral messages, and
this di⁄erence is statistically signi￿cant for the Golden Rule message. Second, the increase
induced by the Suggestion message erodes immediately. Thus, the long-run e⁄ect of messages
seen as the impact on the average contribution in the post-message phase relative to the pre-
message phase is only signi￿cant for the moral messages. This tells us that messages that have
an explicitly moral backing have stronger e⁄ects than messages that demand contributions
without a moral rationale.
The results are also robust to performing statistical tests at the individual level clustering
by group. One question to be dealt with in future research is whether the impact of moral
messages is due to the fact that the messages are labeled as moral, or to the intrinsic appeal
of the principles contained in those statements. In what follows we explore moral suasion in
an enriched strategic environment, and later we turn to the issue of the mechanisms behind
moral suasion e⁄ects.
5Since Andreoni and Vesterlund￿ s (2001) study of altruistic preferences has shown that men are more
likely to care about total payo⁄s and women more likely to care about equality, we could expect the e⁄ects
of the two moral treatments to di⁄er by gender. We ￿nd no signi￿cant di⁄erences in the response to
messages between women and men. However, when comparing part 2 versus part 1, men are signi￿cantly
more responsive to the Utilitarian message than the Golden Rule message (p-value of 0.074). There is no
di⁄erence for women. Also regarding the interaction of personal characteristics with the messages, we ￿nd
little evidence of ideology a⁄ecting the response to messages. The exception is that conservative subjects
respond to the Nash message by lowering contributions more than liberal subjects from part 2 to 1 (p-value
of 0.07).
104 Experiment 2: Moral suasion and punishment
The main take away from our ￿rst experiment is that moral appeals can be used to a⁄ect
cooperation. However, the e⁄ects of moral appeals appeared transitory, which could be
given at least two interpretations. One interpretation is that moral discourse can be an
e⁄ective, though short-lived, instrument to promote cooperation. Presumably, new exposure
to moral arguments may be required over time. Alternatively, it could be that players,
though in principle still willing to cooperate more, eventually start to defect when they
observe that not all players abide by the same principles. Such retraction of cooperative
behavior may be less common when subjects have the ability to punish players that have
been uncooperative. Therefore, it is of interest to study moral suasion in the context of a
richer strategic environment to see whether a moral message can trigger a more persistent
increase in cooperation. In our second experiment we added in each round a punishment stage
after the contribution stage, as in Ostrom et al (1992) and Fehr and G￿chter (2000). This
allowed players to punish low contributors without having to lower their own contributions.
4.1 Experimental design
The experimental design is as in our ￿rst experiment with two modi￿cations. First, we
focused on only two messages for reasons of statistica power: Blank and Golden Rule. Second,
the stage game was modi￿ed to allow subjects to punish their partner after seeing his or her
contribution. After players decided their contributions, a screen showed each her own and
the other player￿ s contribution and the payo⁄s to each. Right after a new screen allowed
them the possibility to pick how much of a reduction in the other player￿ s payo⁄ to impose.
The cost of lowering the other player￿ s payo⁄ in one experimental point was one fourth of
an experimental point.
4.2 Results
We conducted 6 experimental sessions at XLAB, UC Berkeley with a total of 136 subjects.
The subjects were UC Berkeley students. Subjects earned an average of $20:71, with a
minimum of $11:93 and a maximum of $25:45. A high number of subjects (85%) correctly
remembered at the end of the experiment the message that had been shown to their group.
11Panel A in Table 3 and Figure 3 show the evolution of contributions to the joint account
by round and message. Contribution levels before subjects see the messages are greater
than in experiment 1, when punishments were not available. This di⁄erence is signi￿cant
(p-value of 0:001). However, it is interesting to note that these high levels of contributions
decrease with experience. In fact, the level of contributions in round 10 is signi￿cantly
smaller than in round 1 (p-value of 0:003). In other words, while punishments help raise the
level of contributions in the absence of moral messages, they cannot prevent the erosion of
cooperation.
In our new experiment the evolution of contributions before seeing the messages is the
same regardless of the message, as it could be expected given the randomization of messages
(p-value of 0:5 for rounds 1 to 10 and 0:847 for round 10). Surprisingly this is not always
the case for punishments. The groups that ended seeing the moral message appeared to
punish more in the ￿rst part of the experiment. Columns (3) and (4) in Panel A of Table 3
show the evolution of average punishment by round and treatment category. The di⁄erence
in average punishment across treatment categories is not statistically signi￿cant for the ￿rst
nine rounds or for the overall average of rounds 1 to 10 (p-value of 0:211) but it is signi￿cant
in round 10 (p-value of 0:011). Given the controlled nature of the experiment we attribute
this imbalance to a random occurrence.
Did messages a⁄ect contributions in the presence of punishment? From Table 3 and
Figure 4 we see that, aggregating over all rounds before and after the message, the moral
message has a positive e⁄ect on contributions, while that is not the case for the Blank
message. This di⁄erence on the impact of the messages is signi￿cant (p-value of 0:002 for
all rounds ￿ see Table 3, Panel B for the Wilcoxon rank-sum test results). If we compare the
change in contributions from round 10 to 11, we also ￿nd that Golden Rule has a signi￿cantly
di⁄erent e⁄ect from the Blank message (p-value of 0:001).
The ￿rst graph in Figure 4 shows the di⁄erential e⁄ect of the moral messages when
punishment is possible when we consider all rounds. The increase on the level of contributions
caused by the moral message is signi￿cantly larger in this experiment than in the ￿rst (p-
value of 0:021 in a Wilcoxon rank-sum test). This is reported in Table 4 which also shows
that the Blank message does not cause a change in behavior when adding punishments (p-
values of 0:753 for all rounds and 0:14 for rounds 10 and 11). Interestingly, we do not ￿nd
a signi￿cant di⁄erence in the e⁄ect of the moral message across experiments if we focus just
12on the rounds right before and after the message (p-value of 0:847). This indicates that the
main impact of allowing punishments on the e⁄ect of the moral message is not on the initial
response but on the persistence of this response. In fact, this can be easily seen by comparing
the evolution of contributions in the second part of experiments 1 and 2 for the Golden Rule
message (compare Panels A in Tables 2 and 3 or Figures 1 and 3). In our ￿rst experiment,
where punishments were unavailable, contributions decreased markedly with experience after
the moral message. This is no longer the case in Experiment 2 which allows for punishments.
The moral message interacts with the presence of punishment to increase and sustain higher
levels of cooperation.
While it is not central for the issues studied in this paper, it is interesting to broadly
examine the connection between moral suasion and punishments. Table 3 and Figure 4
(top right hand panel) show that the moral message increased punishment relative to the
Blank message if we aggregate over rounds and compare the pre- and post-message phases.
This di⁄erence is signi￿cant (p-value of 0:002, see Table 3, Panel B).6 Given that lower
contributions tend to trigger punishment, one would expect the moral message to have have
two e⁄ects on the punishment meted out by a subject: one direct and positive by raising
the propensity to punish (holding the contribution of the other player constant), and one
indirect and negative by raising the contribution of the other player. The fact that overall the
moral message increases both contributions and punishment suggests that the moral message
creates a large increase in the propensity to punish for a given level of contribution.7
5 How does moral suasion work?
The main conclusion from the ￿rst experiment is that exposure to moral appeals a⁄ects
cooperation rates, and that this e⁄ect goes beyond a pure demand e⁄ect. Moreover, the
6Consistently with the previous literature, we ￿nd that subjects tend to punish subjects that contributed
less but there are also observations of perverse punishments (subjects that contributed little tend to punish
subjects that contributed more than they did). See Fehr and G￿chter (2000), Anderson and Putterman
(2006) and Carpenter (2007).
7Note however that our study is not designed to investigate this assertion in detail. The right way of
assessing it would be to study the response of punishment to messages by keeping constant the subject and
the combination of contributions by herself and her partner. However, not all subjects will be observed to
engage in contributions at the same level after exposure to the message. Those who are may constitute a
non-random sample, complicating a precise identi￿cation of the e⁄ects of moral suasion on the propensity
to punish.
13second experiment suggests that when players can separately decide on cooperation and
punishment, the e⁄ects of a moral message on cooperation can be persistent. A natural
question is what drives the e⁄ects of moral suasion.
One possibility is that the message directly a⁄ects preferences. Formally, this amounts to
a parametric change in the utility function that represents preferences, which in the space of
actions would lead to a shift in each player￿ s reaction function. A second possibility is that
expectations may play a role if subjects have preferences that go beyond maximizing the
pecuniary payo⁄s of the public goods game. For instance, they may not want to contribute
if others won￿ t, but may want to contribute, at least to some extent, if others will.
In this type of setup, players may change their behavior because they believe the message
may have a⁄ected the preferences of others.8 But messages can also have pure coordination
e⁄ects. These expectation-driven e⁄ects require some form of non-sel￿sh preferences, and
the fact that moral messages may a⁄ect behavior by leveraging those preferences is also
intriguing.
In order to clarify the possible role of preferences and expectations, it is useful to lay
out a model that encompasses the di⁄erent possibilities. This model is used exclusively to
illustrate the type of e⁄ects that we have in mind and is not intended as a representation of
the actual preferences of players.
5.1 A simple model
Suppose that each of the two players has a payo⁄function that contains the payo⁄from the
voluntary contribution game, and an extra term ￿ that captures non-monetary payo⁄s. In
particular, suppose that the utility function of each player i is,
U (xi;xj) = m ￿ xi + ￿(xi + xj) + ￿i;i = 1;2;
￿i = ￿xixj ￿ ￿ (xi ￿ ￿i)
2
where m is the player￿ s initial endowment (10 tokens in our lab experiment), xi is the player￿ s
own contribution and xj is the contribution of the other player. Here ￿ is the voluntary
8Similarly, a player may change her behavior because she expects the other player to change his behavior
in the belief that her own preferences had changed, and so on with higher order beliefs rooted in the possibility
of anyone￿ s preferences having shifted, even if they have not. In what follows we abstract from these issues
and explore a model where there is common knowledge of parameters and rationality.
14contribution game￿ s e¢ ciency parameter (in our lab experiments it was 0.7). The term
￿ captures non-monetary payo⁄s and has two components. The ￿rst term ￿xixj captures
a reciprocity payo⁄. This is psychological reward from making a higher contribution xi
when the other player j contributes more. The parameter ￿ ￿ 0 captures the importance
of the reciprocity motive. The term ￿￿ (xi ￿ ￿i)
2 captures a ￿ moral self￿payo⁄; it is a
loss function that detracts from the overall payo⁄ depending on how much the player￿ s
contribution departs from the moral imperative, or target level ￿i ￿ 0 that i believes she
should abide by. The parameter ￿ is a scalar that measures the relative importance of the
moral imperative motive relative to reciprocity and pecuniary payo⁄s.
Given this con￿guration, allowing parameters to vary arbitrarily could generate very
di⁄erent preferences and equilibria. We are interested in isolating three distinct possibilities
with implications for the interpretation of our experimental results. In what follows we ￿x
parameters values at speci￿c levels to facilitate the characterization of the cases of interest
although similar cases may arise for a larger set of parameter constellations.
5.1.1 Pure preference e⁄ects
Suppose that ￿ = 0 (i.e. there is no preference for reciprocity), and that ￿i > 0 ;￿ > 0
(the player perceives a moral imperative and cares about honoring it). Individual utility for
player i becomes,
U (xi;xj) = m ￿ xi + ￿(xi + xj) ￿ ￿ (xi ￿ ￿i)
2 ;i = 1;2:
This is a model where individuals care about pecuniary payo⁄ and about approximating a










Note that in this game the contribution of each player is independent of that by the other
player. The reaction function of player i in the (xj;xi) space is a horizontal line. If the payo⁄
function above represents the true preferences, the only way in which the moral message
could have an e⁄ect in contributions is by a⁄ecting a parameter in the utility function. One
possibility is that the moral message raises the contribution that is deemed morally desirable
15￿i, or that it raises the relative importance ￿ of doing the right thing. Note that increases
in both parameters will raise equilibrium contributions. These e⁄ects exemplify the pure
preference e⁄ects.
5.1.2 Expectation-driven, but preference-triggered e⁄ects
Suppose now that not only the player cares about a moral imperative to contribute a positive
amount (￿i > 0, ￿ > 0) but also that she has a preference for reciprocity ￿ > 0. The objective
function of each player i, i = 1;2; is,
U(xi;xj) = m ￿ xi + ￿(xi + xj) + ￿xixj ￿ ￿(xi ￿ ￿i)
2;i = 1;2:
It is easy to see that now each player￿ s contribution is very much dependent on the other
player￿ s. The reaction function of player i, i = 1;2, is linear and given by,







Thus, whenever ￿i ￿ 1￿￿
2￿ > 0 and
￿
2￿ < 1 the reaction function for player i in the space
(xj;xi) has a positive intercept and a positive slope smaller than one, guaranteeing a sin-
gle intersection of the reaction functions. That is, equilibrium exists and is unique at a







Under these preferences, the only way in which equilibrium contributions may change
is if some parameter changes in one￿ s own utility, or if a player believes a parameter has
changed for the other player. Under common knowledge of parameters and rationality, any
change in contributions following a change in beliefs must correspond to the moral statement
having caused a preference change in at least one of the two players. However, how much a
player will adjust his own contribution depends on whether she believes the other player to
have seen the same message, as this indicates to what extent, if any, the reaction function of
the other player has shifted. This shows that even if players￿contributions respond to their
expectations about what other players have seen, this may be related to e⁄ects ultimately
tied to changes in preferences, and not to pure coordination e⁄ects. This exempli￿es our
idea of ￿expectation-driven, but preference-triggered￿e⁄ects.
165.1.3 Purely expectation-driven, coordination e⁄ects
Lastly, suppose that ￿ > 0 so each player wishes to reciprocate good or bad behavior but
does not feel she needs to match any speci￿c, morally mandated contribution level herself,
so ￿ = 0. The objective function of player i becomes,
U(xi;xj) = m ￿ xi + ￿(xi + xj) + ￿xixj:
If each player believes the contribution of the other player to satisfy xj >
(1￿￿)
￿ then each
player will contribute all of her endowment, validating beliefs, leading to an equilibrium
with maximal contributions m. But if each player believes the other player￿ s contribution to
satisfy xj <
(1￿￿)
￿ then both players will be in an equilibrium with zero contributions. In this
particular case of the model, the players face a coordination game. The reaction functions are
step functions with steps at
(1￿￿)
￿ . These reaction functions have two stable intersections￿
one at zero and one at m. In this game, moral messages may have no e⁄ect whatsoever
in any parameters, and still a⁄ect contributions, by directly a⁄ecting players￿beliefs about
which equilibrium is going to be played. This exempli￿es the ￿expectation-driven,￿or ￿pure
coordination￿e⁄ects.9
5.2 Experiment 3: Do expectations matter?
In this section we present an experiment that suggests that moral suasion a⁄ects behavior
in part through changes in the expectations about others.
5.2.1 Experimental design
To determine whether expectations play a role we replicated the experimental design of our
￿rst experiment with two modi￿cations. First, we included only the Blank and the Golden
Rule messages. Second, we allowed the random message to vary across subjects within the
same group of eight. Subjects knew that the probability that any member of their group
had seen the same message they had seen was capped at 50%. Thus, the expectations held
9Clearly, contributions are not always at the maximum or the minimum levels. Slightly modi￿ed models
will yield reaction functions that cross at low, but positive contributions, and also at high, but not necessarily
maximal, contributions.
17by anyone having seen the moral message that any player they were matched with had also
seen it were necessarily lower than in the ￿rst experiment.
5.2.2 Results
We conducted 6 experimental sessions at XLAB, UC Berkeley with a total of 136 subjects.
The subjects were UC Berkeley students. Subjects earned an average of $23:10, with a
minimum of $18:71 and a maximum of $27:71. A high number of subjects (91%) correctly
remembered at the end of the experiment the message that had been shown to them.
Table 5 and Figure 5 show the evolution of contributions to the joint account by round
and message. As before, in the ￿rst part of the experiment (rounds 1 to 10) the evolution
of contributions follows the usual pattern. Again, it is important to note that there are
no signi￿cant di⁄erences in behavior across subjects that ended seeing di⁄erent messages,
consistent with the random assignment of messages. In this section the unit of observation is
the average contribution by group and message. We then compare the contribution rates in
the same group by message using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Sign-rank test for matching
pairs. We used this test given the lack of independence in behavior of subjects seeing di⁄erent
messages within the same 8 person group
Did messages a⁄ect behavior di⁄erently than in our ￿rst experiment? To answer this
question we now focus only on round 11. The reason is that after this round the behavior
of subjects is a⁄ected by their experience in previous rounds and this may depend on the
message seen by other subjects. As di⁄erent subjects may have played with subjects that
saw di⁄erent messages, behavior after round 11 is less comparable.
From Table 5 and Figures 5 and 6 (bottom left panel), we see that both Blank and Golden
Rule result in an increase in average contributions from round 10 to 11 (a restart e⁄ect).
However, this increase is greater for the Golden Rule message (p-value of 0:037￿ as reported in
Panel B in Table 5). We want to compare the e⁄ect of the moral message in this experiment
to that in our ￿rst experiment. We ￿nd that the Blank message does not a⁄ect contributions
from round 10 to 11 to a di⁄erent extent in Experiment 3 relative to Experiment 1 (p-value
of 0:748; Blank has no e⁄ect on contributions in either experiment). However, the e⁄ect of
the moral message is signi￿cantly smaller in Experiment 3 than that observed in our baseline
experiment when all subjects saw the same message (p-value of 0:012). This suggests that
18expectations play a role in moral suasion and that pure preference e⁄ects cannot explain
the whole e⁄ect of moral messages. Either messages work by changing preferences and this
e⁄ect is then ampli￿ed or mitigated by strategic interaction, or they work exclusively as
coordination devices.10
5.3 Experiment 4: Is there a pure preference e⁄ect?
In this section we study whether moral suasion has an e⁄ect on behavior that operates
directly through preferences, and regardless of expectations on the views or behavior of
other players. In this experiment we hold ￿xed the message seen by a player￿ s opponent,
and compare the players￿behavior depending on whether she has seen a Blank or a moral
message. If, holding the other player￿ s message (and information more generally) ￿xed, the
contribution of a treated player increases under the moral message relative to the Blank one,
this will mean that moral suasion a⁄ects preferences, and that the role of expectations is
complementary. If there is no such increase, this will mean that there are no e⁄ects of moral
suasion through preferences, and that their e⁄ect is purely due to coordination.
5.3.1 Experimental Design
To determine whether moral suasion a⁄ects preferences we replicated the experimental design
of our ￿rst experiment with four modi￿cations. First, we included only the Blank and the
Golden Rule messages. Second, the choice of messages and matching of subjects was such
that half the subjects saw that their opponent had seen the Blank message. Half of these
￿informed￿subjects saw the Blank message and half saw the Golden Rule message. Subjects
knew that if they were informed of their opponent￿ s message the opponent was not informed
about their own message. Third, subjects only participated in one round after the message
to eliminate any possibility of repeated interaction e⁄ects (which would be problematic to
infer e⁄ects over preferences).11 Finally, we adjusted the exchange rate to 8 EPs per dollar
10Again, both possibilities require that subjects care about something other than their own monetary
payo⁄s from the game.
11Under several post-message rounds the following could happen: a subject i that sees the moral message
could believe that people tend to imitate behavior and that the person j she is currently matched with
may later interact with a person z who has also seen the moral message and who will be matched with i
after having encountered j. Not wanting to unfavorably dispose z by sending her a frustrated partner j, i
may behave better towards j for reasons other than a change in i0s preferences. Our design eliminates this
possibility.
19given the reduction in the number of rounds.
In summary, to test whether moral suasion has an e⁄ect through preferences, we compare
the behavior of subjects who received a Blank message with those that received the Golden
Rule message while holding constant the message seen by those they were playing with (the
blank message).
5.3.2 Results
We conducted 10 experimental sessions at XLAB, UC Berkeley with a total of 254 subjects.
The subjects were UC Berkeley students. Subjects earned an average of $19:85, with a
minimum of $15:06 and a maximum of $23:96. A high number of subjects (79%) correctly
remembered at the end of the experiment the message that had been shown to them.
Table 6 and Figure 7 show the evolution of contributions to the joint account by round and
message for subjects that ultimately learnt that their partner had seen the Blank message.
As before, in the ￿rst part of the experiment (rounds 1 to 10) the evolution of contributions
follows the usual pattern. Again, it is important to note that there are no signi￿cant di⁄er-
ences in behavior across subjects that ended seeing di⁄erent messages, consistent with the
random assignment of messages.
From Table 6 and Figures 7 and 8, we see that both Blank and Golden Rule result in an
increase in average contributions from round 10 to 11 (there is again a small restart e⁄ect).
However, this increase is greater for the Golden Rule message (p-value of 0:0004).12 This
suggests that moral suasion a⁄ects behavior not only through a⁄ecting expectations but it
must also have a more direct e⁄ect that can be attributed to changing preferences.
6 Conclusion
We report results from four experiments designed to study whether exposure to moral appeals
a⁄ects cooperative behavior. Moral suasion is ubiquitous in many domains of real life, from
family relationships to organizational and political realms. Yet there is a dearth of evidence
showing that moral statements can a⁄ect behavior. Our paper o⁄ers such evidence. However,
12In this test the unit of observation is the average contribution by group and message for subjects that
saw that their partner in round 11 had seen the Blank message. We then compare for these subjects the
contribution rates in the same group by message using the non-parametric Sign-rank test for matching pairs.
20our results also indicate that the potential for persistent positive e⁄ects depends on aspects of
the strategic environment in which moral suasion is used. In our experiment, the interaction
of a moral frame and the presence of punishments appears important to sustain cooperation
when moral messages or punishments alone could not do so.
An important additional question pertains to the mechanisms through which moral sua-
sion operates. Our design allowed us to identify that moral suasion shifts preferences. But
moral suasion also seems to depend on whether players are con￿dent that others have been
￿treated￿as well, highlighting a role for expectations about mutual behavior. When pref-
erences are either purely pecuniary or based on a strictly individual moral imperative those
expectation-driven e⁄ects cannot arise. Their emergence suggests that moral suasion lever-
ages a pro-social, but also reciprocity-based, aspect of preferences.
The existence of intrinsic preferences such as those based on reciprocity motives is by
now well known. However, the fact that intrinsic preferences can be leveraged to a⁄ect
behavior through relatively cheap methods such as ethical discourse is intriguing, especially
when considering that the provision of incentives that target extrinsic motivation is costly.
Future work should explore in more detail the variety of settings in which moral framing
can be e⁄ective at shaping behavior, as well as investigate the interactions between moral
suasion and extrinsic incentives.
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23Name Message
1 Blank BLANK MESSAGE
2 Nash
Please read this message carefully: The assumption of game theory is that rational and 
self-regarding individuals will maximize their own payoffs. If you were to act accordingly, 
you would allocate 0 to the joint account.
3 Golden rule
Please read this message carefully: An action of yours is moral if it treats others the way 
you would like others to treat you. If you were to act accordingly, you would allocate 10 to 
the joint account.
4 Utilitarian
Please read this message carefully: An action of yours is moral if it maximizes the sum of 
everyone's payoffs. If you were to act accordingly, you would allocate 10 to the joint 
account.
5 Suggestion Please read this message carefully: You could consider allocating all your endowment to 
the joint account. If you were to act accordingly, you would allocate 10 to the joint account.
Table 1: Treatment MessagesBlank Nash Golden Rule Utilitarian Suggestion
Round (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 3.25 3.55 3.59 4.38 3.22
2 3.02 2.98 3.01 3.70 3.38
3 2.60 2.82 3.09 3.46 3.06
4 2.28 2.62 2.73 3.07 2.55
5 2.05 2.68 1.91 3.01 2.56
6 1.85 2.16 1.47 2.96 2.72
7 2.17 2.52 1.53 2.97 2.19
8 1.87 2.06 1.10 2.68 2.62
9 1.82 1.81 1.18 2.47 2.16
10 1.64 1.66 1.11 2.47 1.77
11 2.18 1.58 4.38 4.97 3.70
12 1.52 1.78 3.43 4.17 2.44
13 1.57 1.58 2.58 4.05 2.06
14 1.62 1.42 2.51 3.86 1.86
15 1.26 1.31 1.71 3.69 1.74
16 1.25 1.35 1.47 3.08 1.50
17 1.60 1.32 1.44 3.22 1.17
18 1.18 0.97 1.13 2.98 1.04
19 1.11 0.66 1.00 2.45 0.95
20 1.02 1.09 1.23 2.45 1.39
Average contributions and differences
 Round 11 - Round 10 0.54 -0.09 3.27 2.50 1.93
 Part 1 (pre-message) 2.25 2.49 2.07 3.12 2.62
 Part 2 (post-message) 1.43 1.31 2.09 3.49 1.78
 Part 2 - Part 1 -0.82 -1.18 0.01 0.37 -0.84
Number of subjects 64 64 64 64 64
Nash Golden Rule Utilitarian Suggestion
Blank 0.294 0.093 0.016 0.834
Nash 0.016 0.002 0.208
Golden Rule 0.401 0.036
Utilitarian 0.009
Nash Golden Rule Utilitarian Suggestion
Blank 0.092 0.001 0.031 0.018
Nash 0.001 0.013 0.006
Golden Rule 0.400 0.040
Utilitarian 0.371
Note: we test the hypothesis that the change in contributions from part 1 to part 2 or from round 10 to 11
for groups in different treatment categories stem from different distributions, treating the change in the
average contribution of each 8-person group as a single observation.
Round 11 versus Round 10
Panel A: Contributions by Period and Message
Message
Table 2: Does moral suasion affect cooperation? - Experiment 1
Panel B: Non-parametric p-values (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests)
Part 2 versus Part 1Blank Golden Rule Blank Golden Rule
Round (1) (2) (3) (4)
1 4.75 4.46 0.99 1.39
2 4.49 4.60 0.95 1.38
3 3.83 4.57 1.38 1.51
4 3.93 4.28 0.80 1.64
5 3.67 4.24 1.17 1.52
6 3.82 3.99 1.17 1.85
7 3.25 3.41 1.03 2.58
8 2.93 3.44 1.51 1.80
9 2.85 3.13 1.08 2.62
10 2.88 3.08 1.10 2.87
11 3.03 6.19 1.57 2.58
12 2.74 5.50 1.07 2.25
13 2.73 5.41 1.00 1.96
14 2.76 5.17 1.23 2.40
15 2.47 5.33 1.05 2.89
16 2.76 5.56 0.97 2.64
17 2.80 5.44 1.13 3.13
18 2.41 4.93 1.19 3.45
19 2.51 4.92 0.88 3.50
20 2.61 5.01 0.80 2.93
Average contributions and differences
 Round 11 - Round 10 0.15 3.11 0.47 -0.29
 Part 1 (pre-message) 3.64 3.92 1.12 1.91
 Part 2 (post-message) 2.68 5.35 1.09 2.77
 Part 2 - Part 1 -0.96 1.43 -0.03 0.86
 Number of subjects 64 72 64 72
Part 1 vs 2 Round 10 vs 11 Part 1 vs 2 Round 10 vs 11
Blank-Golden Rule 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.067
Note: in Panel B we test the hypothesis that the change in contributions and punishments  from part 1 to part 2 or from round 10
to 11 for groups in different treatment categories stem from different distributions, treating the change in the average contribution
of each 8-person group as a single observation.
Panel B: Non-parametric p-values (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests)
Contributions
Contributions
Table 3: The effects of moral suasion when punishment is available - Experiment 2
Panel A: Behavior by Period and Message
Punishments
PunishmentsPart 1 vs. 2 Round 10 vs. 11
Blank 0.753 0.14
Golden Rule 0.021 0.847
Note: we test the hypothesis that the change in contributions from part 1 to part 2 or from round 10 to 11 for groups in 
different experiments within treatment categories stem from different distributions, treating the change in the average
contribution of each 8-person group as a single observation.
Table 4: Difference between Experiments 1 and 2: Are contributions different?























Average contributions and differences
 Round 11 - Round 10 0.35 1.52
 Part 1 (pre-message) 2.69 2.36
 Part 2 (post-message) 1.70 1.86
 Part 2 - Part 1 -0.99 -0.51
 Number of subjects 69 67
Blank-Golden Rule
Note: in Panel B we compare contributions between treatments using a matched pairs test.
Each observation is the difference in the change in contributions from round 10 to 11
between subjects that saw the Golden Rule and subjects that saw the Blank message
in a group.
Table 5: Do expectations play a role? - Experiment 3
Message
Panel A: Contributions by Period and Message
Panel B: Non-parametric matched pairs p-values 














Round 11 - Round 10 0.26 2.10
Number of subjects 66 66
Table 6: Are There Pure Preference Effects? - Experiment 4
Message
Contributions by Period and Message for Subjects
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Figure 2: Change in Contributions after Message – Experiment 1
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Figure 4: Change in Behavior after Message – Experiment 2
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Figure 6: Change in Contributions after Message – Experiment 3
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Round 11 versus 10
Figure 8: Change in Contributions after Message when Knowing 
that Other Saw Blank Message – Experiment 4
Blank                                                                                                                         Golden Rule